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Credit default swaps 
and ﬁ  nancial stability
Credit default swaps (CDSs), initially intended as instruments for hedging and managing credit risk, have 
been pinpointed during the recent crisis as being detrimental to ﬁ  nancial stability. We argue that the 
impact of credit default swap markets on ﬁ  nancial stability crucially depends on clearing mechanisms and 
capital and liquidity requirements for large protection sellers. In particular, the culprits are not so much 
speculative or “naked” credit default swaps but inadequate risk management and supervision of protection 
sellers. When protection sellers are inadequately capitalised, OTC (over-the-counter) CDS markets may 
act as channels for contagion and systemic risk. On the other hand, a CDS market where all major dealers 
participate in a central clearing facility with adequate reserves can actually contribute to mitigating systemic 
risk. In the latter case, a key element is the risk management of the central counterparties, for which we 
outline some recommendations.
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C
redit default swaps, introduced in 1997 
by JPMorgan, have become the most 
common form of credit derivative, totaling 
USD 64 trillion of notional value in 2008. With 
the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, this notional volume 
went down to around USD 38 trillion in the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2009 but remains large. These are gross notional 
ﬁ  gures; according to BIS estimates, net exposure 
of major CDS dealers represents USD 2.9 trillion 
in June 2009.1
Sometimes described in the press as “complex 
ﬁ   nancial instruments”, credit default swaps are, 
in fact, the simplest of all credit derivatives. 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract between 
two parties, the protection buyer and a protection seller, 
whereby the protection buyer is compensated for the 
loss generated by a credit event in a reference instrument. 
The credit event can be the default of the reference 
entity, lack of payment of a coupon or other corporate 
events deﬁ  ned in the contract. In return the protection 
buyer pays a premium, equal to an annual percentage 
X of the notional, to the protection seller. The premium 
X, quoted in basis points or percentage points of the 
notional, is called the CDS spread. This spread is paid 
(semi)annually or quarterly in arrears until either 
maturity is reached or default occurs, at which point 
the protection seller pays the protection buyer the 
face value of the reference asset minus its post-default 
market value, through physical or cash settlement. 
Thus, the protection buyer is protected against losses 
in case the reference entity defaults. If the buyer owns 
the reference security, the CDS acts as a hedge against 
default: such ‘insurance against default’ was the initial 
motivation for introducing credit default swaps.
However, unlike insurance contracts, credit 
default swaps do not require exposure to 
the underlying credit risk: a CDS may be used 
to gain a synthetic exposure to the credit risk 
of a ﬁ  rm. Compared to the strategy of holding 
(or shorting) the corresponding bond, 
the CDS strategy leads to the same exposure 
but only requires a small amount of capital at 
inception, equal to the collateral or margin posted 
with the counterparty. Also, in instances where 
the underlying bond may be difﬁ   cult to short, 
the  redit default swap enables to take a speculative 
short position that beneﬁ  ts from a deterioration of 
the issuer’s creditworthiness. The sheer volume 
of the CDS market indicates that a substantial 
portion of contracts are speculative; in principle, 
the outstanding notional of credit default swaps 
may even become larger than the total debt of 
the reference entity.
1| A  CONCENTRATED MARKET
Credit default swaps are over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives: they are not exchange-traded. 
The CDS market is a dealer market where 
a few major institutions control an overwhelming 
proportion of the volume and post quotes for 
protection premiums on various reference entities. 
The 10 largest dealers account for 90% of trading 
volume by gross notional amounts. Concentration is 
even higher in the US market, where the ﬁ  ve biggest 
commercial banks account for more than 90% of 
gross notionals.1 An estimated 30% of global activity 
is generated by JPMorgan alone.
This concentration reached a maximum with 
AIG. On September 30th 2008, the aggregate net 
notional amount of credit derivatives sold by AIG 
was USD 372 billion. This staggering amount was 
almost double the aggregate net notional amount 
sold by all other major dealers combined at the end 
of October 2008.1 These high levels of concentration 
have raised legitimate concern among regulators 
about counterparty risk in the CDS market: in such 
a situation, the default of a major dealer may have 
a large impact on the rest of the market.
1  See European central bank (2009).
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2| CDS SPREADS AS SIGNALS
  ON CREDIT QUALITY
CDS markets have come to play an informational 
role in credit markets, where CDS spreads are 
widely regarded as a market consensus on the 
creditworthiness of the underlying – corporate or 
sovereign-entity. This is also reﬂ  ected in the market 
practice of computing the implied default probability 
of an entity from its CDS spreads and using such 
default probabilities for the pricing of credit 
derivatives. Like implied volatility derived from 
option prices, such implied default probabilities 
do not necessarily contain any information about 
future defaults or the actual likelihood of the default 
of the reference entity, but simply convey a market 
consensus on the premium for default protection at 
various maturities. Chart 2 shows implied survival 
probabilities for Lehman Brothers implied from 
CDS quotes on September 8, 2008, shortly before 
Lehman’s default. This example should temper 
any wild claims as to the “forward-looking” nature 
of the CDS spreads. Note also that the implied 
default probabilities and hazard rates depend 
on the assumption used for recovery rates, which 
are themselves subject to a large uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, CDS spreads are useful indicators 
of credit risk, especially in contexts where the 
underlying debt markets are less liquid.
3| RISK MANAGEMENT 
  OF CDS POSITIONS
Day to day ﬂ  uctuations in CDS spreads can be huge 
and tend to occur in sudden moves, usually associated 
with corporate events or macroeconomic news. 
Chart 3 shows the daily returns in the CDS spread 
of CIGNA Corp. from 2005 to 2009: note the large 
amplitude of daily returns, which can attain 40% 
especially on the upside. These large movements, 
which lead to “heavy tails” in the distribution of 
spread movements, are exacerbated by the relative 
illiquidity of many single name CDS contracts. 
Another concern is obviously the occurrence of 
the underlying credit event which results in large 
payouts, whose magnitude is linked to the recovery 
rate and difﬁ  cult to determine in advance.
To provision for these risks, typically one or both 
parties to a CDS contract may post collateral 
and there may be margin calls requiring 
the osting of additional collateral during 
the lifetime of the contract, if the quoted spread 
of the CDS contract or the credit rating of one 
of the parties changes. Collateral has not been 
systematically required in OTC CDS transactions, 
and sudden deterioration of the underlying 
credit may generate large margin calls when the 
CDS spread undergoes a large move.
Chart 2
Survival probabilities implied by CDS spreads 
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As with other OTC derivatives, credit default swaps 
are exposed to counterparty risk, which affects 
the level of CDS spreads. Counterparty risk exposure 
can be particularly large in a scenario where 
the protection seller and the underlying entity 
default together. This can happen for example if the 
protection seller has insufﬁ  cient reserves to cover 
CDS payments. In this case, a protection buyer 
can incur substantial losses. The AIG ﬁ  asco in 2008 
and the default of Lehman, a major CDS dealer, 
exacerbated the market perception of counterparty 
risk and distorted the level of CDS spreads in 
Fall 2008 and early 2009, stressing the importance of 
counterparty risk in the risk management of credit 
default swap portfolios. Concentration of the market 
on a few interconnected dealers ampliﬁ  es  the 
magnitude of this counterparty risk.
4| CDS MARKETS: 
  CHANNELS FOR CONTAGION?
Credit default swaps have been repeatedly blamed 
for fomenting ﬁ  nancial instability and generating 
systemic risk. The German ﬁ  nancial  authority 
BaFin, in its recent move to ban “naked” CDS trading, 
said CDS moves were jeopardising “the stability of 
the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole”.
Much of the blame has to do with the supposed 
role of speculative (“naked”) credit default swaps in 
pushing up CDS spreads of entities in distress, thus 
making it harder for them to access the debt markets. 
Statesmen have been quoted as blaming CDS markets 
as responsible for the deterioration of their sovereign 
debt, the most recent example being Greece. Yet no 
empirical evidence has been offered to back such 
anecdotic claims. According to ﬁ  gures from the 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), 
CDS positions on Greece amounted to USD 9.2 billion 
(net) in March 2010, up from USD 7.4 billion in 2009, 
less than 2.5% of the Greek government bond market, 
which exceeds USD 400 billion. One might argue 
that it is a case of informational contagion, where 
CDS markets generate a panic in the debt market. In 
fact, in the case of Greece, CDS spreads have closely 
tracked bond spreads in 2010, showing no evidence 
of one leading the other in a signiﬁ  cant  way. 
Finally, there is no evidence that BaFin’s May 2010 
ban on ’naked CDS’ has had any stabilising effect on 
the sovereign debt market.
A more serious concern is the counterparty risk 
generated by the default of large protection sellers, as 
exempliﬁ  ed by the failure of AIG (to pay margin calls 
on its CDS positions). In a concentrated dealer market 
such as the CDS market, the default of a dealer can 
affect many market participants and generate domino 
effects and default contagion. Network models2 may 
be used to provide insights on such contagion effects 
in CDS markets. In presence of a CDS market, the 
default of an entity incurs losses not only for its 
counterparties but also for protection sellers in 
credit default swaps written on this entity. If a CDS 
protection seller has insufﬁ  cient reserves to cover CDS 
liabilities, the underlying credit event also results in 
the default of the protection seller, thus widening the 
scope for contagion. Using a network-based measure 
of systemic risk3, Cont and Minca2 show that a CDS 
market where protection sellers may lack liquidity for 
CDS default payments leads to an increase in default 
contagion and systemic risk.2
Interestingly, whether a CDS is ’speculative’ or not 
is irrelevant here: this is determined by whether 
the protection buyer is exposed or not to the underlying 
bond, whereas counterparty default occurs if the 
protection seller lacks adequate reserves for paying the 
default leg of the CDS. A key issue therefore seems 
to be not the distinction between speculative and 
non-speculative CDS but the adequate management 
of counterparty risk in the CDS market.
5| CENTRAL CLEARING 
  OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
Central counterparties (CCPs) have been proposed 
as a solution for mitigating counterparty risk and 
preventing default contagion in the CDS market. 
A clearinghouse (or central counterparty) acts as 
the buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer of 
protection, thereby isolating each participant from the 
default of other participants. Participants post collateral 
with the central counterparty and are subject to daily 
margin calls. This helps reduce losses in case of default 
2  See Cont and Minca (2010).
3  See Cont (2009).
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and mitigates counterparty risk. Also, management of 
collateral and margin calls by the CCP can help reduce 
operational risk in the CDS market.
A clearinghouse is not an exchange: prices are 
still negotiated over the counter and there is no 
auction mechanism for price ﬁ  xing. However, for 
the purpose of marking positions and computing 
margins, clearinghouse participants are required to 
post quotes for all instruments being cleared, which 
leads to some degree of price transparency.
Currently CDS indices – CDX and ITRAXX – as well 
as their sub-indices (High Yield, High Vol) and single 
name constituents are being cleared by CCPs in 
the United States and Europe. ICE Trust, the largest 
clearinghouse for index and single name CDS, 
began operating in 2009 in the United States. Other 
clearinghouses for credit default swaps are CMDX, 
Eurex and LCH Clearnet.
6| ENSURING THE STABILITY 
  OF CCPS
Given their important role as a bulwark against 
counterparty risk and contagion, CCPs need to use 
stringent risk management procedures to ensure their 
own stability, including in stress scenarios when a large 
dealer may default.4 Risk management of central 
counterparties is currently done at several levels:5
￿  Screening and monitoring of the credit risks of clearing 
members through membership requirements, notably 
based on minimum capital requirements on members.
￿ Margin requirements are used to absorb short 
term losses and ﬁ  rst losses in case of the default 
of a clearing member. The horizon over which 
losses are considered is related to the anticipated 
time frame necessary for unwinding a position in 
the market under consideration. For CDS markets 
this corresponds to a a few days. Margin levels 
are adjusted daily through margin calls.
￿ Guaranty fund or clearing fund: large losses not 
covered by the margin are covered by a guaranty fund, 
to which clearing members contribute according to the 
risk of their position. By mutualising extreme risks, 
the guaranty fund contributes to the overall stability 
of the clearinghouse and reduces systemic risk by 
immunising each member from the default of others.
Margin requirements should be designed to cover 
short term losses, which may arise from CDS spread 
volatility or from losses due to the default of 
the underlying reference entity of the CDS 
(“jump-to-default”). CDS spreads are observed to be 
highly volatile and exhibit large ﬂ  uctuations (Chart 3 
provides an example) and margin levels should 
account for this “heavy-tailed” nature of the risk.
Computing appropriate jump-to-default requirements 
for clearing members should be based on loss given 
default, not on expected loss as is often done in current 
OTC margin agreements. For a stand-alone ‘naked’ 
single name CDS, this would lead to a large collateral 
requirement, which would strongly discourage 
the protection seller. For a CDS portfolio, however, it 
may be feasible to require that the margin covers the 
loss given a ﬁ  xed number of defaults in the portfolio 
over the risk horizon (usually a few days). Current 
practice by regulators is to consider as an extreme 
but plausible scenario 2 or 3 defaults over 3 days in 
an index of hundred names.
Whereas margin concerns the risk of each clearing 
members portfolio, the guaranty fund addressed 
systemic risk faced by the CCP. Guaranty fund 
requirements should not be viewed as an additional 
margin: the guaranty fund’s main role should be to 
mutualise extreme losses in excess of margin. Such 
extreme losses typically occur in the event of the 
default of a clearing member and arise from the cost of 
liquidating its position. The level of the guaranty fund 
should be ﬁ  xed in order to cover liquidation costs in 
extreme but plausible scenarios. Currently IOSCO 
and BIS recommendations require a CCP to dispose of 
sufﬁ  cient funds to cover losses due to default of any 
single clearing member, but regulators have considered 
in practice two or more dealer defaults in some cases.
Central counterparties should stress test their 
risk management system in order to assess 
the adequacy of the level of margin and guaranty 
fund requirements. The outcome of the stress test 
largely depends on the conﬁ  guration of portfolios 
of clearing members: a market where most clearing 
4  See Bank for International Settlements (2004).
5  See Avellaneda, Cont and Zhang (2010).
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members/dealers have are large net protection buyers 
or sellers represents a different risk than a market 
where most clearing members have well-balanced 
long-short portfolios. Therefore a meaningful stress 
test needs to consider different portfolio conﬁ  gurations 
for clearing members and identify (plausible) worst 
case scenarios from the viewpoint of the central 
counterparty’s risk. Such a stress testing approach, 
has been proposed in Avellaneda et al.:6 the idea is to 
simulate plausible portfolio conﬁ  gurations for clearing 
members and consider, across the simulated scenarios, 
the cost of liquidating each dealers portfolios in case of 
their default. This cost, net of margin, determines the 
risk posed by the dealer to the CCP and its allocation to 
the guaranty fund should be determined accordingly.
Interestingly, the results in Avellaneda et al.6 
indicate that, in a clearing system where margin 
levels are set proportionally to the amplitude of 
short term losses of each member’s portfolio, 
institutions whose default leads to the largest loss 
for the clearinghouse are those with well-balanced 
long/short positions with large notionals. As opposed 
to portfolios with large directional exposures, which 
result in a substantial margin requirement, such 
well-balanced portfolios will lead to smaller margin 
requirements thus the main part of the loss in case 
of liquidation ﬂ  ows to the guaranty fund. That such 
portfolios with low margin requirements may pose 
a large risk to the CCP, gives another reason why 
guaranty fund requirements should not be taken 
simply proportional to the margin level.
7| IS CENTRAL CLEARING 
  AN EFFICIENT SOLUTION?
Dufﬁ  e and Zhu7 have argued that central clearing of 
a single class of OTC derivatives (such as credit default 
swaps) while leaving out other derivatives might be 
in fact inefﬁ  cient in terms of the total amount of 
collateral required in the system. Similarly, Dufﬁ  e 
and Zhu argue that having more than a single CCP is 
inefﬁ  cient. The main argument is that hedging effects 
– for example between a bond position and a CDS 
hedging this bond position – which reduce collateral 
requirements in bilateral netting agreements, are not 
taken into account when moving the CDS to a central 
clearing facility which does not clear the corresponding 
bond position. This argues in favor of a joint clearing 
of CDSs and ﬁ  xed income instruments. Joint clearing 
experiments are in fact under way in the ﬁ  xed income 
market, where cross-margining agreements have been 
recently implemented between clearing facilities 
for cash instruments and ﬁ  xed income derivatives. 
Such cross margin agreements will certainly lead 
to more efﬁ  cient allocation of collateral but their 
implementation is not trivial: margin requirements 
across CCPs need to be harmonised and procedures 
for the use of guaranty funds in the event of a default 
of a joint clearing member need to carefully thought 
out in order to provide the right incentives to clearing 
members and avoid loopholes.
The extent to which Dufﬁ  e and Zhu’s arguments apply 
to CDS markets depends on the (long/short) symmetry 
– or lack thereof – between positions of dealers in CDSs 
and other OTC instruments – mainly swaps and debt 
instruments – which would enter netting agreements 
between counterparties. In absence of symmetry 
between CDSs and other positions, it is not clear 
why bilateral netting would result in less collateral.8 
Given that currently most dealers engage in ‘index 
arbitrage’ trades with long positions in CDS indices 
and short positions in the corresponding single name 
CDS, it seems that the major hedging effect to be 
accounted for is the hedge between a CDS index and 
its components. Some CDS clearinghouses, such as 
ICE Trust, already propose joint clearing of single 
name and index CDS  ontracts, using a portfolio-based 
margining approach. This approach has the advantage 
of allocating lower collateral requirements to hedged 
positions, and encouraging dealers to clear a larger 
proportion of their CDS portfolios.
The analysis of Dufﬁ  e and Zhu7 is based on the total 
amount of collateral, not on a measure of systemic 
risk, and notably excludes analysis of default 
scenarios. However, what differentiates credit default 
swaps from other OTC derivatives such as interest 
rate swaps is precisely the binary nature of their 
payoff: while the mark to market value of a CDS 
position prior to default may be a small fraction of 
its notional, the actual exposure it generates upon 
default of the reference entity may represent a large 
fraction of the notional. Failing to account for this 
6  See Avellaneda, Cont and Zhang (2010).
7 See  Dufﬁ  e and Zhu (2009).
8  See Cont and Minca (2010).
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jump-to-default risk leaves out the main component of 
the counterparty risk of a CDS. Using the Systemic Risk 
Index,9,10 a network-based measure of systemic risk 
deﬁ  ned as the expected loss to counterparties when 
an institution defaults, Cont and Minca11 argue that a 
centrally cleared CDS market reduces the systemic 
impact of large ﬁ  nancial institutions, provided all large 
CDS dealers are members of the clearinghouse (see 
Chart 4). Note that these seemingly opposite ﬁ  ndings 
are not contradictory: different metrics (collateral, 
systemic risk) are being used.
Independently from the efﬁ   ciency in terms of 
collateral requirements, regulators may have other 
reasons for supporting the creation of independent 
CCPs under their jurisdiction, with cross margin 
agreements across CCPs, rather than a single 
transnational CCP. Having several CCPs also mitigates 
the moral hazard issue of having to deal with a unique 
CCP which would then become “too interconnected 
to fail”. In a situation with more than one CCP (which 
is the most likely outcome) it is extremely important 
for regulators to ensure that all CCPs are held to the 
same standards in terms of capital requirements 
and risk management: the contrary would lead to 
regulatory arbitrage and concentration of risks in 
CCPs with lower margin and collateral requirements.
8| ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
  OF CENTRAL CLEARING
Central clearing is only effective if a sizable fraction 
of trades are cleared by the CCP. Given that central 
clearing has a cost in terms of collateral, some market 
participants may not be willing to use this facility. If 
regulators view central clearing as a desirable solution, 
they should provide incentives to make central 
clearing an attractive solution for market participants.
An approach which is being increasingly considered by 
many regulators is to make central clearing mandatory 
for standardised contracts. Although it sounds like a 
tough measure, we doubt it would have any serious 
impact other than encouraging the emergence of a new 
market for hybrid structured products, where credit 
default swaps will be camouﬂ  aged as default payment 
clauses in ﬁ  xed income or currency derivatives where 
their risks may be yet harder to track. Yet we note 
that a wide array of derivatives have been successfully 
cleared by CCPs for over two decades, without any 
instance of mandatory clearing. A more effective 
approach would be to impose prudential penalties in 
the form of higher capital and liquidity requirements 
for contracts which are not centrally cleared. 
Currently such penalties exist but, in many cases, are 
lower than the actual cost of central clearing. To avoid 
regulatory arbitrage, such requirements should not be 
limited to standardised contracts but also extended 
to exotic structures. A positive development is the 
commitment, in September 2009, of several major 
derivatives dealers to submit speciﬁ  ed proportions of 
their eligible CDS trades to a clearinghouse.
9| TRANSPARENCY AND MONITORING 
  OF SYSTEMIC RISK
Central clearing cannot be a universal solution for 
counterparty risk in CDS markets. A large portion of 
the CDS market is constituted of bespoke CDS contracts 
9  See Cont (2009).
10  See Cont and Moussa (2010).
11  See Cont and Minca (2010).
Chart 4
Distribution of the systemic risk index
(Y axis: proportion in network)
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CCP with large dealer excluded 
Note: Distribution of the systemic risk index9 of ﬁ  nancial institutions in a market 
without CDS (pink), with bilateral CDS trades (green), and centrally cleared 
CDS (orange). A centrally cleared CDS market which excludes one or more 
large dealers may actually lead to higher systemic risk than a market with 
no CCP (blue).
Source: Cont and Minca (2010).
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which currently lack the standardisation and liquidity 
necessary for central clearing. Far from being anecdotic, 
such bespoke CDS contracts were in fact at the center 
of the AIG’s failure. For such deals, even marking to 
market is an issue since there may be no reference 
market quote at a given time, leading to different views 
across counterparties on the level of margin calls. The 
CDS market has been dubbed one of the most opaque 
sectors of the ﬁ  nancial market and there have been 
many calls for greater market transparency. There 
are two, very different, issues: transparency for the 
regulators and transparency for market participants.
Market transparency is, as always, a double-edged 
sword. A characteristic of the CDS market is the 
large degree of information asymmetry between 
a few dealers – who act as market makers – and other 
“buy-side” market participants. As in other dealer-based 
OTC markets, dealers make markets based on their 
information and would lose any incentive to do so in a 
situation of total transparency, where their information 
would cease to have any value, as in the classical 
analysis of Grossman and Stiglitz.12 Not surprisingly, 
dealers have opposed exchange trading of CDS and a 
forced attempt to do so would simply reduce market 
activity. Private sector data providers such as MarkIt 
and data repositories such as DTCC have contributed 
to some degree of transparency in the CDS market, 
but their effectiveness is limited by the fact that 
participation of market participants is voluntary and 
not all trades are reported.
A totally different issue is the access of regulators to 
adequate information. To ensure adequate capital and 
liquidity requirements for large protection sellers, it 
is necessary to monitor large CDS exposures across 
main market participants,especially in the ﬁ  nancial 
and insurance sectors. In the past, regulators and 
market observers have mainly used indicators based 
on market data, such as CDS spreads and bond spreads 
for monitoring such risks in the market. However, 
given the lack of transparency in the CDS market, it is 
not safe to assume that market levels of CDS spreads 
adequately reﬂ  ect counterparty risk. Indeed, market 
indicators failed to signal the systemic risk posed by 
AIG, simply because market participants were not 
aware of the huge exposures lurking behind the scene. 
This assertion does not necessarily contradict the 
assumption of market efﬁ  ciency, since counterparty 
exposures are not public information hence need not 
be correctly reﬂ  ected in CDS spreads.
DTCC provides aggregate net notional data for 
single reference entities and has recently expressed 
willingness to provide such information to regulators 
upon request. By requiring systematic reporting of 
trades to such trade repositories, regulators could 
improve the coverage of the repositories. But such data 
are not detailed enough in order to assess counterparty 
exposures, which correspond to exposures net of 
collateral. In particular, an accurate assessment of 
counterparty exposures requires knowledge not 
only of CDS positions but also of exposures in the 
underlying debt instruments. A step forward would 
be for regulators to systematically collect such 
counterparty exposure data. An operational solution, 
short of having data on all transactions, is to expand the 
coverage of trade repositories by requiring mandatory 
reporting by market participants, using this data 
for counterparty risk monitoring by regulators and 
requesting complementary reporting from market 
participants on a case by case basis.
12  Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
We have argued that the impact of credit default swap markets can contribute either positively or negatively 
to ﬁ  nancial stability depending on how counterparty risk is managed in these markets. Whereas an 
unregulated CDS market where protection sellers may lack sufﬁ  cient resources in liquidity and capital 
may amplify contagion, a centrally cleared CDS market where all major dealers participate in multilateral 
clearing can actually reduce systemic risk and enhance the hedging function of credit default swap markets.
Central counterparties provide market-based solutions for mitigating counterparty risk. But central clearing 
cannot be generalised to all categories of credit default swaps: a large proportion of the market remains 
non-standardised and unﬁ  t for central clearing. In this context, an important step would be for regulators 
to collect reliable data on counterparty exposures across dealers; mandatory reporting of trades to trade 
repositories could be a ﬁ  rst step. Such exposure data could then be used to monitor counterparty risk in 
the CDS market and set appropriate liquidity and capital requirements for protection sellers.
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